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ABSTRACT 
 
The Arab Region faced a wave of massive public demonstrations in 2011. People across 
the region demanded freedom, justice, and equality. That movement overthrew some of the 
region’s dictatorship regimes that had been in power since decades. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and 
Yemen the regimes collapsed in the face of the people’s revolution. However, public 
demonstrations and opposition could not overcome the Al-Assad regime in Syria. This thesis 
seeks the reasons behind the survival of the Syrian regime when other regimes collapsed. The 
thesis analyzes the case of Syria by comparing it to the case of Libya, since Libya went through 
almost the same features during its revolution, using the case-by-case methodology. The main 
data of the thesis are newspaper and TV statements of individuals who had roles in the conflict. 
The dogmatic conflict between Sunni and Shia, the Syrian regime’s alliances, and the role of Al-
Gaddafi and Al-Assad are among the variables of analysis. The thesis evaluates four main 
reasons that allowed the Syrian regime to resist the revolution: the character of the Syrian 
dictator, the role of the Syrian military institution, the structure of the Syrian society, and the role 
of foreign intervention. The thesis explains why, in the case of Syria, a people’s movement 
became a civil war.           
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Arab world witnessed an unusual phenomenon in 2011, “The Arab Spring.” Waves 
of massive demonstrations occurred in many Arab capitals and major cities with the public 
demanding freedom, justice, and equality. The protests began in late December 2010 in Tunisia 
and inspired equally large demonstrations in Arab countries such as Egypt, Yemen, Libya and 
Syria, as well as smaller scale demonstrations in countries such as Jordan and Morocco. The 
ruling class across the whole Arab world were shocked by this uprising: dictatorships, monarchs 
and presidents were all exposed to the impact of public demands. For the first time since the end 
of the period of colonization regular people in Arab countries were able to gather together and 
unify around political goals. After decades under the oppression of their regimes, the people of 
Arab countries were now in the streets demanding regime change. Their voices were also heard 
all over the world through social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The power of 
technology made it possible for the Arab people to share their revolution as well as support each 
other all the way from the Arabian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean.  
In the Arab world, where dictators had a tradition of ruling in an authoritarian manner for 
many decades, the public had an established fear of displaying personal expression against their 
regimes. The Arab Spring was a breaking point in the relationship between people and their 
rulers. The fear of the regimes was disrupted. People started to recognize what they could do and 
what power they had; they believed they did not have to be subjected to corrupt rulers. The 
streets of Tunis, Cairo, Sanaa, Tripoli, Damascus and many other Arab capital cities were full of 
hundreds of thousands, millions in some estimated reports, of people demanding freedom, justice 
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and equality or even for the regime to leave power. Change was the fixed desire and only change 
would satisfy them. 
By early 2012 many regimes in the Arab world had been changed by the people. Many 
dictatorships were forced to give up their authority and many countries in the Arab world were 
approaching a new era of democracy. However, not all of these Arab uprisings ended well; it was 
different from one country to another. Some countries accomplished a full transformation toward 
democracy, some had struggles to establish a new democracy, and unfortunately for some of 
them the aftermath of the protests turned into chaos and civil war.  
The Puzzle 
The demand for change was the consistent goal for the different national publics within 
the Arab Spring. However, the outcome has been different in different countries. In Tunisia the 
massive demonstration achieved its goal successfully by ending the rule of Zine El Abidine Bin 
Ali. Bin Ali had been the president of Tunisia since 1987 when he came to power by military 
coup against the former president Habib Bourguiba. On 14th January 2011, after approximately 
twenty-nine years in power, the Arab uprising overthrew Bin Ali and forced him to flee the 
country. 
 Egyptians were inspired by the Tunisian rebellion and they went to the streets in the 
capital, Cairo, as well as in other major cities such as Alexandria, to demand a new government. 
The regime of Mohammad Hosni Mubarak had ruled since 1981, after the assassination of 
former president Mohammed Anwar El Sadat. Mubarak was the fourth president of Egypt since 
1952 when a military group called “Free Officers” overthrew the Egyptian monarchy. Mubarak 
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had ruled Egypt like a dictator for about thirty years. The outcome of the Arab spring in Egypt 
occurred on 11th February 2011 with the change of the regime and the overthrow of Mubarak. 
 The people of Yemen followed the Tunisian path and ordered the same demands: 
freedom, justice, and equality. The regime of Yemen under Ali Abdullah Saleh responded more 
aggressively than the regimes of Tunisia and Egypt. Confrontations between the forces of the 
regime and the demonstrators occurred in the capital city of Sanaa; leading to an unexpected 
division within the military. The peaceful revolution had turned into armed tension within the 
military institution itself. A section was still loyal to Saleh while the other section of the military 
decided to stand in favor of public rights.  Saleh was attacked and barely survived. He finally 
agreed to turn over his power to his vice president on the 27th of February 2012, ending his 
thirty-three years reign of the Yemen Arab Republic. He had been part of the government since 
1978 and as the President of Yemen since 1990 after the unification of North Yemen with South 
Yemen. 
The Arab Spring continued to spread to Libya, first appearing in the country’s eastern 
region in the city of Benghazi. The same demands were chanted there as they had been during 
the rest of the Arab uprising. The dictator of Libya, Muammar Al-Gaddafi, was considered one 
of the oldest, if not actually the oldest, dictators in the world, coming to power after a military 
coup against the Libyan monarchy in 1969. The demonstrations of the Libyan people quickly 
turned into a civil war.  Because of the actions of Gaddafi to maintain power, a bloody civil war 
erupted, costing tens of thousands of Libyan lives. With the aid of intervention from NATO the 
revolutionary forces gained the upper hand, Al-Gaddafi was killed by a group of rebels in August 
2011 after forty-two years of holding power. 
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The people of Syria were inspired by the successful revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt to 
start their own revolution. The Arab Spring soon swept the streets of Syrian cities with people 
amassing in numbers by March 2011. The masses of protestors against Bashar Al-Assad’s 
regime started to make their voices heard in the Syrian capital of Damascus and other major 
cities. The demands of the people were the same as elsewhere: freedom, justice, and equality. 
Although the Arab Spring in Syria followed the same pattern as it had in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, 
and Libya the outcome for the Syrians was very different.  The Syrian revolution became an 
ongoing disaster. After five years since the beginning of the Syrian uprising against the Al-
Assad’s regime, the revolution has yet to accomplish its goals. The Syrian regime maintains its 
authority and the revolution has become a massive civil war that is far bloodier than the one 
suffered by Libya. The variation in the outcome between the Syrian case and the other cases of 
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya (especially the Libyan case) is the main puzzle of this thesis.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, revolution is identified as the mobilization of a segment of 
the people of a country to demand political changes from their regime or to change that regime 
entirely (Goodwin, 2001). World history is full of revolutionary incidents, from ancient times 
through to the modern era. Some of these revolutions have been major events in history that 
reshaped the world. The American and the French revolutions are the best examples of such 
major revolutions, changing the concepts of democracy and human rights. A people’s revolution 
marks a remarkable point in any country’s history whether or not the outcome matches the 
public’s expectation. Unfortunately, the cost of revolutions can be high, bringing bloodshed and 
disorder to a country.  As Nietzel (2012, p.1) writes, “As a historical process, ‘revolution’ refers 
to a movement, often violent, to overthrow an old regime and effect complete change in the 
fundamental institutions of society.” When a society lives under the injustice of a regime, 
revolution may be the logical action for the public in order to seek better opportunities.  
Revolution is a signal point to the inadequacy of a certain regime to meet the satisfaction of its 
people. The public, sooner or later, may find a way to demand their rights. Throughout an 
upheaval, the populace of the country can be recognized by their involvement in the struggle.   
Tullock (1971) provides a framework to consider the choices people may make when 
faced with a revolutionary situation: 1, a group of people may remain neutral; 2, a group of 
people may join the protesters; and 3, a group of people may stand with the regime. The first 
group, in general, does not track with any certain interest. They have faith that the conflict will 
end no matter who is the victor, and the country will eventually be restored to order. The second 
group may see opportunities in toppling the regime. For example, they may gain membership in 
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the new government’s ranks or at least gain respect by being seen as a patriotic revolutionist. The 
third group, generally, acts from a comfortable situation, such as gaining profit from the existing 
regime, and the alteration of that government will likely damage or destroy their interests. This 
clash over interests and position can easily dissolve into civil war if none of the belligerents can 
achieve victory in a short period of time.  
Revolution is one of many stages of violence a society may experience. With the cases of 
the Arab Spring the violence of revolution was driven by demands for changes of regimes that 
had never responded to satisfy their subjects. Gurr (1970) distinguished three mental traditions 
about the standard foundations of human violence. First, violence is exclusively instinctive. 
Second, violence is exclusively learned. Third, violence is an intrinsic reaction triggered by 
frustration. Gurr (1970) explained that violence is a persistent improving instinct, assuming that 
the majority or entirety of men have inside them an autonomous base of violence desires. Violent 
actions are learned and used intentionally in the struggle for political principles, whether national 
policies or ideological views. Violence happens as a response to frustration that is interfering 
with goal-engaged actions. According to Dollard (1939), the incidence of violent revolutionary 
activities continuously presumes the presence of frustration and, in reverse, the presence of 
frustration continuously leads to some form of violent behavior.  Within the Arab societies that 
faced the waves of the Arab Spring, people were under the oppression of their regimes for many 
decades, and generations started to develop and adopt Gurr’s (1970) three sources of human 
aggression and violence. 
People fight for revolutionary causes because they believe that their causes are right.  
Political violence, including revolutions, has aspects that may justify aggressive action toward a 
regime. Ideology is one key factor that has justified violence for rebel groups. “Men’s ideational 
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system, including their political ideologies, usually incorporate norms about the desirability of 
political violence; they may prohibit the use of violence as an instrument of political competition 
or prescribe violence as an historically justified response to political oppression; under 
conditions of strain or discontent, however, new ideas circulate among the discontented which 
are more likely to offer normative justification for violence” (Gurr, 1970, p. 194). The Arab 
uprisings did not occur after a few years of political oppression, but after many decades of 
dissatisfaction under oppressive regimes. People started to form ideas about overthrowing their 
governments even if it accordingly meant that violence would play a role in reaching their goals. 
The people of Libya and Syria were under dictatorship regimes that failed to meet the 
expectation of their subjects.  
However, it is important to take into consideration that when groups of rebels rise up 
against a government that the ideologies may differ from one group to another. Thus, the success 
of the rebellion might be at risk; “Most participants in political violence, revolutionary or other-
wise, do not carry complex ideologies in their heads; the subtleties of justification articulated by 
revolutionary leaders” (Gurr, 1970, p.195). This explanation applies to the Syrian revolution 
where the rebels were fragmented into many groups with different ideologies and goals - such as 
the Free Syrian Army aiming for a new society without Al-Assad and on the other hand ISIS 
with the aim of establishing an Islamic Khilafat1.  
In certain circumstances, discontented people are exposed to new thoughts of revolution 
and violence. It is easier to mobilize discontented people via the diversity of ideologies, slogans, 
rumors and, for the case of the Arab Spring, through the advantages of social media (Gurr, 1970; 
Skinner, 2011).  The vast use of social media, especially after the Egyptian revolution, pictured 
                                                          
1 “Khilafat” is the common Arabic spelling, but many English sources write it “Caliphate.” 
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the act of violence as justified and rational in order to stand against an oppressive regime. 
Another key aspect of political violence is the utility of violence that shows violence as a rational 
choice (Bray, 2009).  The majority of participants in group demonstrations and acts of violence 
have utilitarian motivations, as well as pure anger. Conflict theorists commonly accept that 
people are rational or at least rationalistic in circumstances of struggle. Hence, they have a 
tendency to select the paths of action that they consider making the most of the probability of 
accomplishing what they are aiming for (Gurr, 1970).  After the accomplishments of the 
Tunisian revolution, the motives of public demonstrations and revolutions against regimes spread 
all over the Arab world.         
In some cases, revolution may lead to a civil war. Kalyvas (2006) indicated that civil war 
is an armed disagreement within the territory of a recognized sovereign state amongst parties that 
were under the supreme authority of that state but now disagree due to their dis-satisfaction 
toward that authority. When the circumstances lead to a struggle amongst the forces of a regime 
and an armed militia or a group of rebels, it may not be precise to classify it as a civil war. The 
conditions of civil war comprise a massive armed conflict between the regime and its people 
who have become a fully organized army. When each of the central parties effectively gathers 
enough of the population onto its side, thus dividing the entire nation into at least two distinct 
central rivalries in the armed conflict, then a “civil war” would be the accurate classification.  
If the parties within an armed revolution are themselves fractured, even though they may 
have a mutual objective in challenging the old system, many obstacles for revolutionary efforts 
are generated. As Pearlman (2013, p.40) said, “...political fragmentation, meaning the lack of 
coordination among actors producing unified political action, is distinct from social 
fragmentation, referring to the cleavages that divide a population.” For a society with many 
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splinter groups in its structure, the potential success of its rebellion would be far less than a 
society with little fragmentation.  According to Honore (1988, p.38) “...a rebellion can have one 
of three justifying aims. The aim may be the radical one of changing or the conservative one of 
preventing change in an existing society. Alternatively, the goal may be to break away from an 
existing society and create a new one.” Changing regimes became the goal of the Arab uprising 
and preventing this change the counter-goal of ruling regimes. In the case of Syria, and some 
other countries, creating a new society, was the goal of the people participating in massive 
demonstrations. Unfortunately for Libya and Syria the waves of protest turned into destructive 
civil war between fragmented parties. Hence, it has been hard to achieve the initial goals of the 
protesting masses, and also to resolve the conflict. 
In the case of Syria, religious schism is a key expression of internal fragmentation that 
defines conflict between the regime and the opposition, and within the opposition. Sunni Islam 
and Shia Islam are the major camps of the Islamic religion. Although they share the belief of one 
God, one prophet and one holy book, they have extreme variations toward some other Islamic 
matters and practices. The main argument between them is the question of succession, who is the 
rightful successor to the Prophet Mohammed? For the Sunni the rightful person to be the 
Muslim’s Khalifat2 is the most qualified one; while for the Shia, the rightful figure should be 
someone descended from the prophet’s blood line. This disagreement has affected the Muslim 
world since the first decade of Muslim history. With time, this Sunni-Shia conflict became an 
identity for its supporter even on the regime level. For example, the whole society of Iran is 
known as Shia and its regime purely follows the Shia methodology. The regime of Al-Assad in 
Syria is a great supporter of the Shia minority in a society that contains a Sunni majority. The 
                                                          
2 Many English sources use the spelling “Caliph” for the word “Khalifat.” 
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social identity of the majority of Syrian Muslims is Sunni, but they have a regime that advances 
the Shia minority. Hence, the regime is against the stream of the society’s structure. The conflict 
of Sunni-Shia continues and has spread over almost every aspect of Muslim practices. However, 
the conflict becomes fatal when it is embedded within a political struggle like that in Syria. The 
Syrian case is notable as the regime of Al-Assad, unlike any other Arab regime, is supporting the 
Shia against the Sunni. 
The autocrat family of Syria, the Al-Assad family, does not belong to the sect of Sunni 
Muslims nor to the sect of Shia Muslims. The Al-Assad family belongs to the Alawite sect. The 
Alawite sect is another branch of Islam. The Alawites agreed with the Shia on the matter of 
succession but the Alawites have a supplementary statement in the magnification of Imam Ali, 
Prophet Mohammed’s nephew and son in law, supposedly advancing him with celestial features. 
“Until 1920, the Alawites [of Syria] were known to the outside world as the Nusayris or Ansaris. 
The name change was imposed by the French when they seized control in Syria. ‘Nusayri’ 
emphasizes the group's different approach to mainstream Islam, whereas ‘Alawi’ suggests an 
adherent of Ali (the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad) and accentuates the religion's 
similarities to Shia Islam” (Fildis, 2012, p. 150). The Alawite community makes up only 12% of 
the Syrian population while approximately of 70% of the Syrian people are Sunni. For the 
Alawite the Sunnis are their main rival due to the many dogmatic disagreements with them, 
including the matter of succession and the interpretation of the Muslims’ holy book “the 
Qur’an.” To the Alawites the Shia is their closest ally since at least they have some common 
beliefs with them. This connection has been strengthened after the Islamic revolution of 1979 in 
Iran. The Iranian regime, which belongs to the Shia sect, and the Syrian regime, whose leader 
belongs to the Alawite sect, have become very strong allies. As Primoz Manfreda (2016) stated, 
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“Alawites are often portrayed as religious brethren of Iranian Shiites, a misconception that stems 
from the close strategic alliance between the Assad family and the Iranian regime (which 
developed after the Iranian revolution in 1979), but this is all politics. Alawites have no historical 
links or any traditional religious affinity to Iranian Shiites.” 
The Al-Assad regime in Syria is heavily backed up by the Shia Iranian regime and some 
of the Shia militias who got involved into the Syrian war, such as the Shia Lebanese militia of 
Hezbollah. The historical conflict between the two Muslim’s major faiths, the Sunni and the 
Shia, has affected the Syrian revolution and its outcomes even though the Al-Assad family does 
not follow the faith of either of them. Al-Assad and his regime, as they are pro Shia, guaranteed 
the support of their Shia Allies in this conflict while, on the other hand, the Sunni opposition of 
Al-Assad, especially the extremist groups, are considering this conflict as a holy war. This is 
why the Syrian revolution in one of its aspects has been highly impacted by the historical Sunni-
Shia conflict and has gained more complexity.  
The situation in Syria is not as simple as it looks. It is not just a conflict between the 
forces of the Syrian regime against the Free Army, which represents some of the public 
demands. The situation has deep roots through the components of the Syrian society in general. 
Indeed, it is more likely to be a settling of accounts from the course of Syrian history. The 
conflict has many dimensions in addition to the people’s demands for freedom, justice, and 
equality. In fact, it is better framed as a conflict between religious parties and a conflict between 
dissimilar ethnicities. Al-Assad, as the figure of the Shia minority in Syria, has all the necessary 
support from almost all of the Shia population. However, while the Sunni are the majority in 
Syria they do not agree on a figurehead leader. What makes the conflict even more complicated 
is the mixed ethnicity in Syria, with a Kurdish minority. The Kurds have been seeking their 
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independent sovereignty for decades, and through this civil war they may achieve their claim, at 
least partially. Unlike other Arab regimes that faced the wave of the Arab Spring, the Syrian 
regime has a better chance to survive the phenomenon, especially, retaining the head of state. Al-
Assad has successfully taken advantage of Syrian society; a fragmented society has less 
opportunity to reach victory in its revolution than a unified society. A context of disunited parties 
in the time of armed revolution, although sharing a common goal of challenging the regime, will 
generate many obstacles for revolutionary efforts. 
 As Lane (2008) stated, revolution is not the change of a regime by another political 
party. It is the change of a regime by its own subjects. The concept of revolution in this thesis is 
the uprising of the people without any motivation from external agents. Even though the Arab 
Spring spread out and moved from a country to another, it moved by the willingness of the 
people within each country without any encouragement by external forces or agencies. Some 
conspiracy theory advocates may look at the phenomenon with an eye towards external agendas. 
However, there is no clear evidence that foreign actors initiated the processes of revolution and 
civil war in Syria. Revolution contains two elements: change in the political structure and 
massive participation (Goodwin, 2001), a situation that describes the actions of the people of 
Syria against the Al-Assad regime.  
External, or foreign, intervention is when another country, often a more powerful 
country, is trying to alter the conflict. The intention may be to the advantage of the regime or to 
support the rebellion’s efforts. International intervention is based on treaties, international laws, 
and on state domestic actions (Farer, 1969). In the Syrian case, a formal role has been played by 
international powers, especially the veto-wielding members of the UN Security Council. Also, 
Syria has experienced intervention from regional countries, including those who have supported 
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the regime (e.g. Iran) and those who have supported the revolution (e.g. Turkey). Comparing the 
Syrian case to the Libyan case provides a clear example of how a legal and just international 
intervention can change the revolutionary situation. In Libya the forces of the regime were the 
dominant side of the conflict until the international community, represented by NATO, decided 
to change the equation. The security council of the UN agreed and gave the green light to NATO 
intervention. The Libyan regime forces were defeated and the revolutionary forces were 
advanced. With the Syrian case there is no such international agreement on the matter. All the 
interventions, whether by the regime’s supporter like Iran or the rebels’ supporter like Turkey, 
lack international authority. 
International intervention usually plays a large role in the case of revolutions, but there is 
the question of whether it is legal and just for a country to intervene into the issues of another 
country and, accordingly, violate the sovereignty of that country. Fixdal and Smith (1998) 
discussed the matter of foreign intervention through the lens of human rights and by analyzing 
the three models of Donnelly (1995). The first model is statism. In this model, human rights are 
in principle the responsibility of the sovereign nation-state; accordingly, there is no general right 
to intervene.  The second model is internationalism. This approach acknowledges the centrality 
of states and sovereignty but stresses the international social practices that regulate interstate 
relations. For internationalists, intervention is permissible if it is authorized by the society of 
states. The third model is cosmopolitanism, which corresponds to Wight's Kantianism (1994). In 
this model, the international system is seen as consisting of individuals rather than states; states 
have rights only if they promote the rights and welfare of their citizens (McCarthy, 1993). In this 
perspective, sovereignty is beside the point: the real issue is how to meet the needs of the world's 
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citizens (Pastor, 1993). Accordingly, when massive human right abuse occurs, the burden of 
proof lies on those who argue for nonintervention (Fixdal and Smith, 1988, p. 292-294).  
In the Libyan case the UN intervened into the conflict in order to protect human rights. 
However, in Syria even though there was much evidence of human rights violations by the 
regime international intervention never took a place. According to Fixdal and Smith (1998) there 
are two conditions that justify a humanitarian intervention. First are cases where the country 
agreed to join UN peacekeeping forces. Second are the cases of intervention into so-called failed 
states. In Libya the intervention of foreign forces came within the first year of the revolution, but 
in Syria after five years of massive civil war, a legal and just authorized foreign intervention has 
not yet happened.  
One of the aspects that made the Syrian revolution unique in its outcomes is the reaction 
of the Syrian regime towards the public demands. Syria is under the control of a dictator who is 
descended from another dictator, his father. This is one of the differentiations between Syria and 
other Arab countries that experienced the Arab Spring revolutions. After decades of family 
control over Syria, Al-Assad has secured his position in power more than any other Arab leader, 
and he has gained the support of many institutions and individuals within Syria and as well as 
creating external alliances. The case of Al-Assad’s authority can be analyzed through the lens of 
autocratic resilience theory in order to explain the survival of the Syrian regime. Therefore, the 
resilience of a regime can be explained by selectorate theory that connects political entity’s 
organizations for choosing its leaders to the policy selections leaders make and their scenarios 
for survival (Gallagher and Hanson, 2013). The actors contain the supporters of the selectorate, a 
leader, and a contestant. The disenfranchised, occupants of the organization who are not part of 
the selectorate, play a limited role in this theory. In each institution, there occurs a subsection of 
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the populace "Whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required 
to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled 
out by the government's leadership" (De Mesquita, 2003, p. 42). Distinctive features that explain 
the potent role of actors in the selectorate, or exclusion from it, comprise the following: 
individual origin and ancestry; extraordinary talents, ability, or understanding; affluence; and 
sexual category or age.  
The theory also explains the winning coalition as the "Subgroup of the selectorate of 
adequate scope such that the subgroup's support endows the governance with political authority 
over the remnants of the selectorate as well as over the marginalized members of the social 
order" (De Mesquita, 2003, p. 51). What establishes an "adequate" size differs according to a 
state's specific influential measures. Even in a situation of social equality with complete 
agreement, for example, variances in electoral procedures generate diverse pathways for 
capturing office and therefore forming alliances of different magnitudes (Gallagher and Hanson, 
2013, p. 5). A crucial statement of the model is that the charge of providing private goods to the 
affiliates of the winning coalition is proportionate to the coalition’s dimensions (Gallagher and 
Hanson, 2013). When winning coalitions are minor the minimum costly process of obtaining the 
support of the coalition is with private goods, but the greater the size of the winning coalition the 
greater the temptation for leaders to change to provide public goods. Since public goods by their 
nature are accessible by all followers of the organization, a great winning coalition produces 
larger general welfare. As Bueno de Mesquita (2003, p. 329) states, "Leaders survive longest 
when they depend on a small coalition and a large selectorate. They also do least under those 
conditions to promote the well-being of most people living under their control.” In this situation, 
followers of the winning alliance are the privileged few who obtain private goods. The likelihood 
19 
 
 
is low that they will continue to be so blessed if an opponent increases their authority. With no 
motivation to desert from the leader's alliance supporters’ loyalty persists. This theory was 
designed to analyze the Communist regime of the USSR. It is also applicable for the Syrian 
regime. The situation in Syria is a game of coalitions among the social order of society. The Al-
Assad family chooses to gain support from a minority of social groups in Syria rather than to 
stand with the majority. In return the minority is raised in power, politically and economically, 
and remains loyal to the rule of the regime against the demands of the public in order to maintain 
their privileged status in society.   
Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, p. 314) define a regime as “a set of basic formal and 
informal rules for choosing leaders and policies,” and the leadership resembles the selectorate. 
They explain that in order to maintain authority, leaders are required to maintain the provision of 
supporters of this group. However, leaders similarly have significant capability to impact the 
membership of the group. Their discussion of the selectorate is distinguished by the claim that 
formal rules do not determine membership in the group: “Bueno de Mesquita et al, also use the 
word Selectorate to identify those citizens who influence the selection of leaders, but our 
leadership group is more similar to what they call the Winning Coalition, the subset of the 
Selectorate from which leaders come” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014, p. 315-317). They 
agree with de Mesquita that the leadership group has prominence in authoritarian regimes, but 
they disagree about the features of the group. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) think that the 
elementary functional characters of the governance assembly, such as the hierarchical 
connections that distinguish officer groups, mark autocratic choice making; their autocratic 
government category coding depends on these kind of features and characteristics. 
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Following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) an essential reason for the persistence of 
the autocratic regime of Al-Assad in Syria is the hierarchical system that depends on the rule of 
the elite. Al-Assad’s winning coalition is combination of Alawites, Shia, and other individuals 
whose interests depend upon the persistence of the regime. Hence, the nature of the regime and 
the fragmentation of Syrian society intersect. A further factor is Al-Assad’s foreign policy 
choices, especially his international alliances with Iran and Russia. The revolution in Syria 
exposed to the world a very resolute example of authoritarian survival and it insistence on 
maintaining authority when facing a people’s revolution. Sadly, we have witnessed the disastrous 
results of a confrontation between the forces of people’s revolutionary anger and the forces of an 
authoritarian regime.  
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The political science literature provides a framework to investigate the question driving 
this thesis. Why did the regime of Syria under the leadership of Bashar al-Assad remain in 
power, while the Arab Spring overthrew other regimes? The conflict between the regime forces 
and the rebel forces in Syria has been ongoing since 2011. What is different in the abilities of the 
Syrian regime compared to the Arab regimes that fell in the course of the Arab Spring? The 
ability of the Syrian forces to fight against multiple groups, regardless of the fragmentation of 
society, is impressive in comparison to the other regimes of the Arab Spring and their failures to 
maintain power over their countries. 
In the case of Syria, the current regime of Bashar Al-Assad is a continuation of the 
system of his father’s regime when unjust abuses of authority were familiar. Bashar, as a civilian 
President, tried to make some changes when he came to the Presidency. Yet the inherent 
traditional oligarchical system of his father prevented his attempts to change Syrian politics. 
From the beginning, the Arab Spring movement was started by people who demanded justice 
and equality, people who were tired of being under governments that had been exploiting their 
power against the public good or the public interest. The people of Syria were passive for many 
decades under the regime of the Al-Assad family, but when they saw the possibility for 
revolution in the context of the Arab Spring, they could not resist the winds of change. Using the 
general framework of autocratic resilience and selectorates (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014; 
de Mesquita, 2003), the staying power of Bashar Al-Assad will be examined. 
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In Syria Islamic ideology plays a key role in the underlying societal fragmentation that 
defines the mechanisms of autocratic resilience. Syria is the only country in the Arab region 
where the president and most of the regime members are Shia supporters and the major 
population is Sunni. Is this a factor in the Syrian regime’s survival? Furthermore, how does the 
structure of Syrian society play a role in the extension of the conflict? The structure of Syrian 
society is more complex than any of the other Arab countries, with a great fragmentation in 
ethnicity including the Arabs, the Kurdish and some Turkish groups. This ethnic fragmentation 
intersects with the religious partition between the two major Muslim doctrines Sunni and Shia. 
There is also a significant number of Syrians identifying as Christians. 
A further consideration is the role of external countries. Iran is the center of Shiaism in 
the Muslim world and has supported their Syrian ally. Would the Syrian regime be able to hold 
onto their authority without external assistance? The Libyan regime did not receive any 
assistance from regional or international forces. In fact, the international community represented 
by NATO was assisting the revolutionary forces by sending a series of daily air strikes against 
Gaddafi’s forces. The intervention of Shia militias in Syria has been noted since the early days of 
the civil war, and the diplomatic support of Russia by using their right to veto in the UN Security 
Council is well known.  
This thesis will engage these questions and intersecting processes to try to understand the 
reasons that make it possible for the Syrian regime to continue to survive the Arab Spring. The 
general question of why did Al-Assad survive the Arab Spring leads into four specific questions 
and their related variables. Two of them are directly related to the regime and the other two have 
indirectly played a role in the standing of the regime. Essentially, the puzzle boils down to the 
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nature of the regime, the form and fragmentation of opposition, and the role of external countries 
and non-state actors. 
First of all, the character of the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad is considered.  It is 
hypothesized that the background of the head of the Syrian regime plays an important role in the 
term of presidential legacy and resilience in the face of revolution. In contrast to other Arab 
presidents, Al-Assad has heritage to his power, from his father Hafez Al-Assad.  A family legacy 
rather than a military coup installed him in power.  His family supports the Shia Muslim 
minority in the country, in contrast to the other presidents in other countries who belong and 
support to the Sunni majority. In terms of age, he is younger than other Arab leaders. When the 
Arab Spring started in Syria, Al-Assad was forty-six years old while the other presidents were 
over sixty.  
The second question focuses upon the role of the military in securing an autocratic 
regime. The military has taken a major role in both the Syrian and Libyan revolutions. In Libya, 
a large part of the military forces decided to join the rebellion, while others fought against them; 
especially the military troops in the Eastern part of the country. In contrast, in Syria the majority 
of the military institution has remained loyal to Al-Assad’s regime, and just a small number of 
soldiers and officers have joined the rebels. The military institution is one of the most substantial 
tools for a dictatorship to survive and to provide the balance of private and public goods to the 
selectorate. Al-Assad still has a sufficient and efficient control of the military. 
The third question considers whether the numbers of belligerents in a conflict has an 
impact upon the outcome. This question investigates the role of societal fragmentation in 
autocratic resilience (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014; de Mesquita, 2003). In Syria Islamic 
fundamentalist groups (such as Al-Qaeda) have joined the fight, taking their own side and not 
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supporting the revolutionary army, the Free Syrian Army, or the ruling regime. Later in the 
conflict another Islamic extremist group was established, claiming the right to represent the 
Islamic Khilafat and giving themselves the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).  
Other groups have joined the conflict as well, whether they stand with the regime, the 
revolutionaries, or with the fundamentalists is up to them. This complicated situation was not the 
case in Libya. 
The fourth question considers whether the alliances of a regime can influence its ability 
to resist revolution. In contrast to the Libyan situation, which is the main comparative case study 
for this thesis, the Syrian regime formed alliances with Russia, China, and Iran. Russia has 
heavily backed the Syrian regime in the UN Security Council using its veto right to prevent any 
sort of decisions against the Syrian government’s interests. Also, Russia has supplied the Syrian 
regime with an arsenal of weapons.  In terms of weapon deals and agreements, the Iranians have 
encouraged the Shia Militias to join the fight with the Syrian regime’s armed forces. A Lebanese 
militia called Hezbollah “Party of God” has been participating in the conflict alongside the 
Syrian regime since the early days of the fighting, with the support of Iran. China keeps its 
economic relationship positive with the Syrian regime, which ensures an influx of money into 
the regime’s treasury. It is hypothesized that these alliances of the Al-Assad’s regime made him 
able to withstand the challenge of the rebels and drove the country into a massive civil war. 
The last question is related to the previous one and regards the role of external 
interventions in the success of the revolution. Specifically, the intervention of other countries 
(either regional powers such as Turkey and Iran or international powers such as the United States 
and France) will be considered. In Libya, an external intervention backed the rebel forces 
politically and militarily. Yet in Syria the situation is quite the opposite. The international 
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interaction in Syria was very limited and has not reached the expectation of the Syrian people as 
well as the Arab world in general. Moreover, the foreign intervention in Syria is actually in favor 
of the Al-Assad regime. There have been some statements that have been made by the White 
House, the European Union, Turkey, and the Arab League3 stressing the necessity of supporting 
some rebel groups, such as the Free Syrian Army. However, these external actors have not yet 
come to an agreement over their goals or the means to attain them 
These five questions will be used to compare the Libyan and Syrian cases to shed light, in 
an inductive procedure, on the intersection of reasons that have led to the Al-Assad regime 
staying in power despite facing a revolution and a protracted civil war.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 The Arab League is a council consists of the most Arab countries their main goal is to provide 
the necessary support to its members when needed as well as to set the disagreements among 
them. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This thesis follows the comparative method of study, particularly a case-by-case study of 
Syria and Libya. By applying the comparative method, the thesis will organize the two cases in 
terms of their similarity in some general characters but with a variation in the outcome. As David 
Collier (1993, p.1) says, “Comparison is a fundamental tool of analysis, it sharpens our power of 
description and plays a central role in concept formation by bringing into focus suggestive 
similarities and contrasts among cases.” The comparative method seeks to analyze the 
similarities and differences of the two or more events in order to find the reasons why those 
events ended up with the same outcomes or, in other cases, with different outcomes. “By 
comparing, the researcher is able to do what is necessary to develop a theory more or less 
inductively, namely categorizing, coding, delineating categories and connecting them” (Boeije, 
2002, p. 393). For example, in the case of the Arab Spring the method can seek the pattern of 
behaviors by the regimes, the rebels and the societies in which they are in conflict to categorize 
them under the same or different stream. 
One of the branches of the comparative method study is the case-by-case study that 
allows the researcher to pick a case as their central case and another case as the comparison case. 
The two cases must have similarities and differences to allow for analysis.  According to 
Eisenhardt (1989) the cases-by-case study assists the researcher to build a theory by following 
these steps: getting started, selecting cases, creating instruments and protocols, entering the field, 
analyzing data, shaping hypotheses, enforcing literature and reaching closure. The method itself 
can be the way of generating a new theory, or it may be a way to advance a theory that has been 
defined by the researcher. With the Syrian-Libyan comparative aspects, this method would 
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provide an examination and explanation for the behaviors of the actors, the direct and indirect 
actors (Tellis, 1997). Within this thesis the direct actors are identified as those who have played a 
tangible role in the conflict, such as the Syrian regime and the rebel groups. Indirect actors are 
those who have played a role by only condemning and denouncing the immoral actions of the 
Syrian regime and the violations of human rights without having a presence in the ground 
conflict: Saudi Arabia and Qatar are two examples. In both cases, the regime forces and the 
rebellion forces are the main direct actors, and later on some foreign forces have joined the 
conflict as direct actors (NATO in the Libyan case and the Iranian with Hezbollah in Syria). In 
the Syrian situation, there is also Islamic fundamentalist groups that can be identified as direct 
actors. However, these groups will not be included in the detailed analysis, because it will 
distract the thesis away from its main questions.  In both cases the United Nations and the Arab 
League remain indirect actors.   
The central case of this thesis is Syria. The central research design task is to find a 
suitable case to compare. The best comparison to the Syrian case, among all the countries that 
were involved in the Arab Spring, is Libya. The people of Syria and Libya started their uprising 
similarly by protesting in the streets demanding freedom, justice, and equality. The regimes of 
both countries did not respond to the public peacefully. Instead they responded with oppression. 
The regimes of Syria and Libya used their armed forces to end the uprising. The result in both 
cases was armed confrontation. In both countries, as groups of people started to fight back 
against the regime, groups of the regime’s armed forces joined the rebellion. As a final outcome, 
a civil war occurred, which turned both countries into chaos. Yet the Libyan people succeeded in 
overthrowing their regime and capturing their dictator within a year of the revolution. In the 
Syrian case, on the other hand, protests failed to overthrow the regime and the civil war is still 
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ongoing after four years of the initial revolution. This thesis is seeking the answer behind the 
failure of the Syrian revolution in comparison to the Libyan one: The failure that enables the 
regime of Al-Assad to maintain its power.  
The case-by-case study analyzes variables to see how they have intersected to generate a 
different outcome for the Syrian case. The variables are: 
1. The character of the president 
2. The structure of the regime and the role of the military  
3. The structure of society 
4. The role of foreign intervention.      
In terms of President’s character, Al-Assad differs from Al-Gaddafi in many points, 
though some characteristics are shared. Unlike the Libyan dictator, Al-Assad does not have a 
military background. He is a civilian president who was an eye doctor before becoming the new 
dictator of Syria in 2000. Bashar Al-Assad, in comparison to Al-Gaddafi in particular, and other 
Arab dictators in general, is younger in age and has spent less years in power. At the time of the 
Arab Spring, Al-Assad was forty-six and had spent about ten years in power. Al-Gaddafi was 
sixty-nine and had spent around forty-two years in power. The unique character of Al-Assad may 
play an essential role in the survival of his regime in comparison to other regimes that faced the 
wave of the Arab Spring. 
The regimes in Syria and Libya both came to power via a military coup, Al-Ghaddafi in 
1969 and Al-Assad senior in 1971. Power was subsequently inherited by Bashar al-Assad from 
his father.  Furthermore, both regimes were secular. In each case, the response to the Arab Spring 
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demonstrations was to suppress them through military forces. The key difference between the 
regimes is the religious factor. In Syria the regime favored the Shia against the Sunni, even 
though the majority of the Syrian are Sunni. In Libya, there is barely any Shia presence in the 
country, and the regime itself was close to being one hundred percent Sunni. Hence, the 
comparative role of religious preference is examined. 
Among the Arab countries that experienced massive demonstrations in 2011, Syria is the 
most unique of them. The Syrian society in contrast to the other societies of Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen and Libya has a complicated social structure. The society in Syria is divided into many 
identities that are categorized by religion and ethnicity. The situation in Syria, after four years of 
catastrophic civil war that started by a call for human natural rights, is now a conflict of social 
ideologies and identities. Even within the revolutionary forces themselves there is no common 
agreement. They are divided by religious doctrines. For example, the Free Syrian Army and the 
Army of Islam have a different religious identity even that they are Sunni Muslims, and the goals 
of Arab fighters and Kurdish fighters are of different ethnic backgrounds. The role of Syrian 
society’s complex structure in advancing the regime of Al-Assad is examined. 
Finally, the role of foreign intervention in the comparison of the Syrian and Libyan 
revolutions can be seen through the alliances of both regimes. For forty years, the Libyan regime 
did not build a strong network of alliances, especially with major powers. When the civil war 
occurred in Libya many countries, including the United States and Russia, condemned the brutal 
uses of the regime’s forces, and the UN Security Council voted for a lawful international 
intervention in Libya in order to protect civilians from their government. The situation in Syria is 
quite the opposite. The Syrian regime is allied with two major powers, both with veto power in 
the UN Security Council (Russia and China); as well as alliances with one of the major regional 
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powers in the Middle East (Iran). Of these allies, Russia has recently intervened militarily. 
Hence, the role of external alliances and interventions in perpetuating Al-Assad’s regime will be 
analyzed. Table 1 lists the variables that are analyzed in both countries: Syrian and Libya.  
Table 1. Summary of variables 
The variable Syria Libya 
Sunni-Shia conflict yes no 
Dictatorship regime yes yes 
Military stood with the regime yes no 
Regime allied with major powers yes no 
Lawful foreign intervention no yes 
Foreign intervention is in favor of the rebels no yes 
President’s character differs from the social majority yes no 
Civil war occurred yes yes 
Islamic fundamentalist groups have a direct role yes no 
 
Data collection  
The data contains the statements of the main actors if applicable and related to the 
questions of the thesis. The main actors of this thesis are: the head of the Syrian regime Bashar 
Al-Assad, the Syrian foreign minister Walid Muallem, the representative of Syria to the United 
Nations Bashar Jaafari, and Syrian prime ministers since 2011 (Syria has had five prime 
ministers since the beginning of the revolution in 2011). The statements of these actors are used 
to analyze and measure the structure of the Syrian regime as well as to analyze the character of 
the Syrian president. For the matter of social structure and military institutions, the thesis 
analyzes news reports that are dealing with those two variables, such as primary reports from 
Syria and Libya. Also the statements of some religious leaders like Hassan Nasrallah the 
Secretary General of the Lebanese Militia Hezbollah, and the official statements of some rebel 
armed group like the Free Syrian Army are taken into consideration as well. The United States’ 
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President Barak Obama, the United States’ Secretary of State John Kerry, the President of Russia 
Vladimir Putin, the president of Turkey Rajab Tayb Ardogan, the Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, the Kings of Saudi Arabia Abdullah and Salman bin Abdulaziz, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations Ban Ki-Moon, and the statements of key people within the 
European Union and the NATO are analyzed to evaluate the role of foreign intervention in Syria 
and Libya.  
The data are collected from three main sources: the first source is newspapers, the second 
source is TV channels and the third source is online analysis and reporting websites. To make 
sure that the sources are representative of a variety of voices and opinions, the data are collected 
from three different regions: The United States, Europe and the Middle East. The newspaper 
sources from the United States are: The New York Times, The Huffington Post, The Los 
Angeles Times and USA Today, The Foreign Policy, The Worldnews, The Newsweek. The 
newspaper sources from Europe are: The Daily Star, The Guardian, The Independent, and The 
Daily Telegraph (UK), Sputnik News (Russia) and El Pais (Spain). The newspaper sources from 
the Middle East are: Al-Ahram (Egypt), Al-Akhbar and The Daily Star Lebanon (Lebanon), The 
Middle East (Saudi Arabia), Quryana News (Libya) and Times of Israel (Israel). TV channel 
sources are: CNN (USA), BBC (UK), Al Jazeera network (Qatar), Al Arabiya (Saudi Arabia), 
Al-Hurra (USA) and Rudaw TV (Iraqi Kurdistan). Online analysis and reporting websites 
sources are: The Pew Research Center, The Jamestown Foundation, The National Public Radio 
(NPR), The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), Al-Monitor, The Kurdish 
Project and Joshua Landis blog, (USA), The Middle East Eye (UK) and Russia Direct (Russia). 
Analyzing data from this variety of sources from different areas enable the collection of a 
diversity of various voices and opinions and address the complexity of actors in the Syrian civil 
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war. Key words used in the data collection include words and phrases such as Syrian revolution, 
Syrian civil war, Arab Spring, Al-Assad, Free Syrian Army, and conflicts in Syria.    
The primary object of the data is to incorporate the statements of people who represent 
the main actors in the conflict and analyze them with reference to the questions and variables 
described earlier. The most essential statements are those from Syria, whether from the Syrian 
regime or the Syrian rebels. The voices and opinions of those who represent the governments of 
the United States, the European Union, and Russia are also analyzed. In addition, some other 
voices such the secretary general of the UN, voices of the Saudis and the Turkish, and voices of 
Iran and Hezbollah are included. The international voices are given secondary weight since the 
main focus of the thesis is the internal dynamics of the Syrian revolution. The data illustrates the 
roles of Bashar Al-Assad and his family, the Syrian military, and the different factions of Syrian 
rebels.  
The data collection was limited to the period beginning in 2011, the starting point of the 
Arab Spring and October 6, 2016, when the data collection ended. However, some statistical and 
factual data were collected from dates before the event of the Arab Spring.   
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ANALYSIS 
 
What makes the Syrian revolution and its outcomes complicated is the variety of the 
variables and the way they intervene with each other in a complex way. The complexity is 
addressed through a number of questions, starting with the characteristic of the President, 
moving to the role of the military and the social structure, and ending by discussing the impact of 
foreign intervention. All of the above help us to address why the Syrian revolution has failed. In 
this section of the thesis, the questions are addressed by analyzing a variety of newspapers, TV 
channels, and analysis and reporting websites sources that show the voices of many 
representatives of the Syrian conflict.  
The Character of the Dictator 
Syria 
 The first question addresses the role of the characteristics of the Syrian regime’s 
president Bashar Al-Assad and how his background has played a role in the survival of his 
regime. Moreover, to what extent has Bashar Al-Assad, and some of the Al-Assad family 
members in general, played a role in creating and maintaining the ongoing conflict in Syria? In 
order to answer this question, we need to take a closer look at the history of the Al-Assad family 
to better analyze the role of his character and background on the ongoing Syrian conflict. 
Bashar inherited power over Syria via his father Hafez Al-Assad who took over the 
power and the authority of Syria in 1970 after a military coup. The Arab world has witnessed a 
lot of military coups after the era of European colonization, especially, from the end of World 
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War II until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Like other Arab presidents, Hafez al-Assad was 
believed to be preparing one of his sons to inherit the authority of the country after him; that son 
was not Bashar, it was his older brother Bassel who was a lieutenant colonel in the Syrian army. 
However, Bassel died in a car accident in 1994, just six years before the death of his father and 
the coronation of his brother Bashar as the new president of Syria in 2000. Unlike other Arab 
presidents who faced the Arab spring, Bashar was not a military man from the beginning of his 
career. He had to join the military right after the death of his brother Bassel by the order of his 
father. He was forced to leave his career as an eye doctor to become part of the Syrian military in 
1994 when he was around age thirty. This change in his life might affect his reaction toward the 
rebellion. Bashar was not the favorite Al-Assad member to take the presidency, yet the death of 
his brother Bassel made him the choice of his father to succeed him. According to Hussien 
Shobokshi (2014), Bashar has the problem of acceptance within himself due to the fact that he 
was not the first choice of his father, but Al-Assad senior had to choose him after the death of 
Bassel who was the first choice of succession. With this psychological matter in his character, 
Bashar had to prove himself in front of the Al-Assad family and his father’s generals within the 
military institution who doubted Bashar’s capabilities from the beginning. Oppressing the 
revolution and saving the legacy of the Al-Assad family would be the great chance for Bashar to 
silence anyone within his family and his regime who was uncertain whether he was the right 
person to succeed his father. 
In fact, Bashar was just following his father’s methodology in terms of suppressing a 
revolution. In 1982, a political and a social movement was organized in Hama, a city located 132 
miles north of Damascus, by the Society of Muslim Brotherhood against the regime of Al-Assad 
senior, specifically, and against the rule of the Arab Socialist Baath Party in general. Hafez Al-
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Assad did not hesitate to use the ultimate force of the Syrian army to burn the city down in order 
to restrain the movement and crush the rebels. As a result, between ten thousand to thirty 
thousand people were killed; many thousands of people were injured; and sixty to seventy 
thousand people were made homeless. Also, around eighty-eight mosques and five churches 
were destroyed (Paul, 1990, p.23). The action of Al-Assad junior toward the 2011uprising in 
term of suppressing a social movement against the regime is a replication of Al-Assad senior’s 
behavior in 1982.  
Like many Arab dictators, Bashar has installed many people of his family in important 
positions within the governmental structure. The high ranked positions of Al-Assad family 
members have played an essential part in the retaining the Al-Assad family in power. One of the 
most powerful men in Bashar’s regime, the man who is considered to be the second in command, 
is his younger brother Maher, who is the leader of the Syrian Republican Guard and Bashar’s 
most trusted counselor. In fact, Maher was expected to be the one who would succeed his father 
after the death of his older brother Bassel since he was an officer in the Syrian army and Bassel’s 
right hand man. But surprisingly Al-Assad senior decided to choose Bashar instead. Maher was 
assigned to lead the Syrian forces in its effort to oppress the revolution. Maher has led the Syrian 
forces against the rebels in many battles including the siege of Deraa, the siege of Homos, and 
the battle of Aleppo. Another person of Al-Assad’s family who played a role in the survival of 
the Syrian regime is Hillal Al-Assad who was killed on March of 2014 after an attack by some of 
the armed opposition groups. Hillal is the son of one of Bashar’s uncles and he was the 
commander of the National Defense Forces in the city of Latakia (a branch of the Syrian military 
institution that was founded in November of 2012 just to deal with the rebels and to put down the 
revolution). Hillal was known as one of the most brutal members of al-Assad family when it 
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comes to the family interests. Latakia is considered as the base of Al-Assad family and to a large 
number of Alawi families, so his main task is to secure the stronghold of the family. The 
following quote illustrates the way Hillal’s role was seen by media commentators:  
 “The first major military action this militia saw was during the famous attack of August 
4th 2013, when Sunni groups attacked 11 Alawite villages.  The attack ended, but the 
military scrimmages continued, especially now with this Anfal attack in the Kassab 
region. When Hilal died, the National Defence forces (al-Difa’ al-Watani) had grown 
from being composed of only a few local “popular committees” (Lijan Sha’biyah) into a 
small-sized army, complete with a few tanks and many pieces of heavy artillery” 
(Mohammed D., 2014).  
After about five years of the Syrian revolution, the Al-Assad family has stayed in power due, in 
part, to the solidarity among the family members, and especially by putting some of them in the 
place of authority. 
In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, the presidents and the government officers all 
belonged to the majority religious structure, but in Syria it is totally the opposite. The Al-Assad 
family belongs to the Alawite minority, while the majority of the Syrian population belongs to 
the main stream Sunni. As a president who belongs to the minority group in the religious 
structure of the country, Al-Assad family has to ensure that people who belong to the majority 
group, the Sunnis, will not take the majority of positions within the governmental structure. 
When the uprising occurred most governmental officials were either from the Al-Assad clan or 
from other minorities.  "Power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of just a few 
people in Assad's clan, which has grown autistic and seems to have chosen to just keep going," 
according to Paris-based expert Karim Bitar told the Agency France-Presse (AFP)” 
(Dailystar.com, December 26/2012).  
The same article went on to describe the religious and minority backgrounds of members 
of the regime in more detail:  
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 “Assad's circle includes his brother Maher, 44, who heads the army's elite Fourth 
Division and his wife Asma, an analyst told AFP on condition of anonymity because of 
the sensitivity of the subject. The group also includes Assad's notorious businessmen 
uncle Mohammed Makhluf, 80, cousin Rami Makhluf, 43, and Damascus security chief, 
Hazem Makhluf, aged 41. Like Assad, all are members of the minority Alawite 
community, except his wife, who is a Sunni Muslim. The Presidential affairs minister 
since 2009, Mansur Azzam, aged 52, and former Al-Jazeera journalist Luna al-Shibl are 
also close to Assad. Both are members of the Druze community. Alawite Hussam Sukkar, 
a security advisor to the president, is also key, as are two Sunni veterans: National 
Security director Ali Mamluk and Political Security chief Rostom Ghazali. "This is the 
group that takes the decisions," the analyst said. "Bashar, who runs the show, only listens 
to people who owe him, for the most part, for their rise." Dailystar.co.uk, 12/26/2012  
The decision makers in Al-Assad’s regime were chosen and selected very carefully in order to 
promote the rule and the continuance of the regime. The strategy of creating a closed bloc of 
governmental officials and decision makers was seen to be beneficial by the time of the 
revolution. At this time Bashar had almost the entire support from within the regime since he 
was the one who put them in their positions. The will of the public had not been a factor in 
deciding the personnel of the regime. 
 The last aspect of Al-Assad’s character in this analysis is his age. In comparison to the 
other Arab presidents, Bashar is the youngest, and he is considered as one of the second 
generation of Arab leaders since the end of the colonization era after the World War II. In 
comparison to the dictators of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, Bashar is different in term of 
how he came to the presidency. The other dictators took the power by the actions of their own 
hands. In contrast, Bashar came to the position of authority by the action and decision of his 
father Hafez when he decided to prepare him as his successor. He is among few Arab rulers, like 
King Abdullah of Jordan, who had the chance to study abroad. As a young president, Bashar 
may consider himself better than the others who had fallen after the wave of Arab Spring. He 
may think that he has a better education, and he is from a very well-known family in his country 
by the time he took over the power. Also, he wants to prove that he can survive the revolution 
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when the others could not. In one of his recent statements he said “Ten years later, I want to be 
remembered as the person who has been able to save Syria, but that does not mean that I will be 
president at the time,” he added, “Syria will be fine and I will be the one who saved the country." 
(France 24.com, February 21/2016). After nearly five years of the revolution in Syria, the Syrian 
autocrat Bashar Al-Assad has proven that he has the resilience to survive the people’s uprising. 
Leading the country into a massive civil war that has cost hundreds of thousands of casualties 
and massive destruction to the country’s infrastructure, Bashar Al-Assad still sees himself as the 
rightful president of Syria, and has the determination to stay in power.  
Libya 
When Muammar Al-Gaddafi came to power in Libya in 1969, he was already a 
charismatic person. He was one of the officers, specifically a Captain, among a group of officers 
under the name of “The Libyan Revolutionary Command Council” who led the One September 
coup of 1969 which overthrew the Libyan monarch4. Later, Al-Gaddafi was selected by the 
revolutionary leaders to be chairman of the The Libyan Revolutionary Command Council 
(RCC),” and promoted to the rank of Colonel. After the bloodless coup of 1969 “he governed 
Libya as Revolutionary Chairman of the Libyan Arab Republic from 1969 to 1977 and then as 
the "Brotherly Leader" of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya from 1977 to 
2011” (World News. Com, June 13/2016). Al-Gaddafi did not inherit his position from someone 
else, he was among those officers who had taken the power from the previous authority. 
Therefore, Al-Gaddafi did not experience the question whether he was right man for the position. 
This is in contrast to Bashar Al-Assad who faced many uncertainties from some of his family 
members and some of his father’s regime officers when he was chosen as his father’s successor. 
                                                          
4  The last monarch of Libya was Muhammad Idris As-Senussi (12 March 1889 – 25 May 1983). 
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This dissimilarity in the background between the two dictators is one of the characteristic factors 
that may have lead Al-Assad to deliver Syria into its current fate. 
Another variation in characteristic between the two regime leaders is that Al-Gaddafi did 
not belong to a religious minority group within his country. Al-Assad belongs to the Alawite sect 
of Islam while Al-Gaddafi belonged to the Sunni Muslims. When the Libyan revolution started 
the issue of religious conflict did not occur since Libyan society is not fragmented by religious 
diversity. In addition, Al-Gaddafi did not have the support of foreign Muslim militias that are 
against the majority, compared to Al-Assad who has the support of some Shia militias such as 
the Hezbollah of Lebanon. What if Al-Gaddafi was not a Sunni? Would he and his regime have 
received the support of the non-Sunni militias? There is high chance that the answer of the 
previous questions might be yes. If so, the Libyan revolution may have gone down the same path 
as the Syrian one.    
The Role of the Military 
Syria  
Dictatorships gain their strength mostly from their military institutions, the armed forces 
that act as the iron fist of regimes and secure the control over their oppositions. In this section, 
the analysis interprets question two of the thesis by analyzing the role of the Syrian military 
institution in the survival of the Syrian regime. In every country around the world, whether in 
ancient or modern periods, the military institutions, and the army in particular, hold ultimate 
physical power within the state. Military institutions are essential for a regime to insure the 
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control of the country’s territory, and it becomes ever more essential during the time of 
uprisings. 
When the Arab Spring began in Tunisia on December of 2010, the Tunisian Army did not 
get involved in the matter. The military decided to support neither the regime nor the protestors; 
the army was a neutral factor in the uprising. The situation was similar in Egypt where the army 
did not support the regime or the people in the January 25th revolution. The Egyptian military 
stepped away from conflict; they only came to the streets of Cairo to keep order at particular 
major areas in the city. Yemen and Libya experienced a slightly different attitude by the military 
institutions. In both countries, the army was divided into two sections: one was in favor of the 
regime and the other was in favor of the people who claimed to have overthrown the regime. In 
Yemen, Lieutenant General Ali Al-Ahmar, the president’s cousin and the commander of the 
northwestern military district and the 1st Armored Division, supported the revolution. In Syria, 
although a few soldiers and officers abandoned the regime, the military institution as a whole 
favored the regime. The Syrian revolution was the only case in which the military strongly and 
almost fully stood by the side of the regime.   
The Syrian army remains loyal to the regime, and the matter of disobedience is not an 
issue to the Syrian regime. To the Syrian military institution, the decisions that have been made 
by the regime are not questionable and the army is willing to devastate many parts of the country 
in order to put down the rebellion. Evidence of the army’s brutality has become a part of daily 
life across Syria. Al-Qaboun, a district of Damascus, stands witness to this fact: 
Qaboun in Damascus saw fierce fighting between rebels and government forces in July 
2012 and was destroyed over a lengthy period. A restaurant owner called Walid says: "I 
saw the bulldozer demolishing my shop. The shop was opened by my grandfather many 
years ago... all of my family's hard work was destroyed in one second.” Walid told 
Human Rights Watch that the demolition took place over 50 days: "The army demolished 
41 
 
 
1,250 shops and 650 homes. 1,800 families had to evacuate. There were two or three 
families in every house. The Syrian army gave the shop-owners 24 hours to empty their 
shops. Homeowners were given only three hours to pack their stuff and leave. It was not 
enough time. People barely took anything with them." independent.co.uk, 01/31/2014 
   
The Syrian army has acted in a far more ruthless manner against rebels than in any of the 
other Arab countries in the period since the Arab Spring. This kind of inhumane action by the 
army, especially against civilians, serves as a clear message to those who are fighting or 
opposing the regime on what punishment may await the people who present a challenge and 
support the rebels. In Egypt during the first few days of the revolution against Mubarak’s regime, 
only police departments with riot police had the responsibility to defend the regime while the 
Egyptian army stepped aside as a neutral player (Aljazeera.net, January 30/2011). It was clear in 
the first statement of Egyptian army in the revolution of January 25th that the army was 
supporting the legitimate demands of the people and the preserving of the nation and its gains 
(Ahram.org, January 25.2015). Even in the aftermath of the revolution the Egyptian defense 
minister Field Marshal Mohamed Tantawi said that the army would not stand behind the 
overthrown president nor send soldiers to fire on the protesters (The New York Times, February 
11/2011). There is no comparison between what the police are capable of and what the army can 
do when it comes to the men, power and weaponry. Police forces cannot protect a government in 
the case of war, this job is for military forces. The brutality of the Syrian army is just one aspect 
of how dedicated it is to preserving the regime against the uprising. 
The factor that Al-Assad’s regime is pro-Shia also helped the regime to gain more control 
of the military. Al-Assad appointed many of his family members to the top of the military 
hierarchy. Also, he and his regime would assign many Allawi officers or pro-Shia officers as 
leaders of military units to insure their loyalty to the regime and not to the people. A few 
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Alawites are mainly in charge of the Syrian army, which supposedly has to defend a country that 
is majority Sunni. As the result of this kind of military hierarchy, when the uprising of the people 
of Syria took place the leaders of the Syrian Army and the Syrian military in general stood 
beside the regime rather than being neutral or supporting the rebels. Military units showed their 
willingness to destroy the people’s will from the beginning of the revolution. From many videos 
and news reports that have been released via social media, it was obvious how much hatred the 
regime’s army expressed towards the public and especially the rebels (The Guardian.com, May 
4/2013). For the military, the war is not about putting down a revolution but is a way to advance 
the dogmatic beliefs of their leaders, especially, those who belong to the Alawite sect against the 
opposite beliefs of the most of the Syrian people (Aljazeera.com, October 10/2011). The army of 
the Syrian regime objective, which is considered to be one hundred per cent a Muslim army, was 
destroying as many mosques as they could. This included many historical mosques especially in 
the cities of Aleppo and Hama through the claim that the rebels were hiding and positioning 
inside these mosques (USA Today.com, April 24/2013). The action of destroying a mosque is a 
very unusual practice by Muslims even during the times of wars against each other. If mosques 
could not survive the brutality of the Army in putting down the revolution, imagine what the 
army has done to other types of buildings and infrastructure. By the fifth year of the ongoing 
uprising, the regime’s forces have turned most Syrian major cities and towns into ruins.  
This divergence in the loyalty of the military institution has played one of the most 
important roles in the survival of the Syrian regime and the continuance of the conflict in Syria. 
The Syrian case stands in contrast to Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and more obviously Libya where 
the regimes collapsed to the willingness of the people. One of the reasons that the Syrian army 
did not turn on the regime is that Al-Assad has managed to put many Alawite and pro-Alawite 
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officers in charge of military units. In Libya a large part of the army sided with the people, 
including some of the high ranked commanders. While in Syria, most of the Syrian army’s 
soldiers and their commanders remain in favor of the Syrian regime. Most authoritarian state 
regimes cannot survive without gaining the favor of the military institution. This was the 
situation in Libya, yet in Syria the regime is still in control of its army. 
Libya 
In Libya Gaddafi’s son Sa’if Al-Islam Al-Gaddafi, told Libyans: “The army will play a 
big role [in defending the regime], it is not the army of Tunisia or Egypt. It will support Qaddafi 
to the last minute” (Al-Sayda (Libyan State TV), February 20/2011; Quryna.com, February 
21/2011). However, despite this statement a large section of the Libyan army decided to disobey 
Al-Gaddafi’s orders to attack cities that had revolted against the regime’s authority. There were 
even some reports stating that the military’s chief-of-staff and minister of defense, Major-
General Abu Bakr Yunis Jaber5, was detained by Al-Gaddafi after refusing to carry out orders to 
conduct brutal repression of protesters in Libya’s cities (al-Hurra, February 21/2011). 
 The kind of division between the military and the public that has occurred in Syria did 
not exist in Libya. When the Libyan revolution took place in 2011, many of the military leaders 
decided to side with the people and not the regime. One of the generals that disobeyed the 
Libyan regime and defected to the rebels’ side was Abdul Fatah Younis, the Minister of Interior 
during the rule of al-Gaddafi. He had become the Libyan rebels' chief of army staff, but was 
assassinated later on by pro-Gaddafi agents, according to the rebel authorities (The 
Guardian.com, July 28/2011). This was a huge boost for the rebels and altered the balance of 
                                                          
5 He was one of Gaddafi’s comrades during the military coup of 1969 and a member of The 
Libyan Revolutionary Command Council. 
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power between the public and the regime. According to the BBC “One of the generals who 
spoke to reporters in Rome, named as Oun Ali Oun, read an appeal to fellow soldiers and 
security officials to abandon the regime in the name of the martyrs who have fallen in the 
defense of freedom" (BBC.com, May 30/2011).  The same report quoted another general, Melud 
Massoud Halasa, who told reporters “that Col Gaddafi's forces were only 20% as effective" as 
they were before the rebellion, as "not more than 10" generals remained loyal to him (BBC.com, 
May 30/2011).  
Because a large number of the officers and soldiers of the Libyan army had turned to the 
side of the people in their demand for the regime change, the Libyan regime ended up with hiring 
many African militias to fight for the regime. While many of the Libyan high-ranking military 
officers had turned against their government or remained neutral, the situation is quite the 
opposite in Syria. High ranked generals stayed faithful to the regime and to the Al-Assad family. 
Riad Al-Assad, the officer who established the Free Syrian Army, was only a colonel in the 
Syrian Air Force before he defected to the side of people in July of 2011. The establishment of 
the Free Syrian army has played a big role in attracting many members of the Syrian military 
institution to the side of the rebels, especially Sunni soldiers and officers. However, the dissident 
movement was not enough due to the lack of men and weaponry (Aljazeera.net, October 
13/2012) and most of the high military commanders are still in favor of the Al-Assad regime. 
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The Structure of Syrian Society 
Syria 
The structure of Syrian society has been embellished and altered by many cultures, 
ethnicities and religious groups throughout history. As a result of the many successive groups of 
people that have lived and settled in Syria through history, contemporary Syria has one of the 
most complex society structures in the region. The majority of the current Syrian population is 
Muslim, yet there are many divergences and dissimilarities among them. These cleavages are 
one of the reasons that the Syrian revolution has not succeeded. Moreover, beside the religious 
differences, Syrian society is impressively rich in term of ethnicity in comparison to many 
countries within the Arab World. This situation has impeded the rebels from accomplishing the 
goals of the rebellion. The variation in religious dogmas and ethnic groups within Syrian society 
has caused fragmentation that negatively affects the Syrian revolution. 
Three cleavages are evident in Syrian society. With regard to religious differences, there 
are two cleavages. The first is the Sunni-Shia conflict that is evident in the fight between the 
rebel armed forces and the regime’s forces and its allies’ forces and militias. The second 
cleavage is the dogmatic conflict between the rebel groups themselves and the emergence of ISIS 
(Daesh). Furthermore, there is the matter of ethnic variation within the Syrian society, a 
component that should be considered as the third cleavage. This cleavage requires consideration 
of the role of the Kurds and what have they contributed toward the revolution.  
Islam was divided into two main sects of practice since the first century of the Islamic 
origination. The majority of Muslims (85%) embrace the Sunni sect while there is a minority 
group of Muslims (15%) who accept the Shia sect as their Islamic doctrine (CFR.org, 2011). In 
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Syria the Shia population is approximately around 3-4 million, estimated to be 15%-20% of the 
total population of Syria (Pewforum.org, 2009) These figures can be compared to the estimated 
Shia population and the percentage of the total population in countries that have at least 100,000 
of their entire population as Shia Muslims. Table 2 lists countries with more than 100,000 Shia 
Muslims within their population, indicating the percentage of the Shia relative to the country and 
to the world.  
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Table 2. Countries with More Than 100,000 Shia Muslims  
Country 
 
 
Estimated 2009 Shia 
Population 
 
Approximate 
Percentage of 
Shia Population 
Approximate 
Percentage of 
World Shia 
Population 
Iran 66 – 70 million 90 – 95% 37 – 40% 
Pakistan 17 – 26 million 10 – 15 10 – 15 
India 16 – 24 million 10 – 15 9 – 14 
Iraq 19 -22 million 65 – 70 11 – 12 
Turkey 7 – 11 million 10 – 15 4 – 6 
Yemen 8 – 10 million 35 – 40 ~5 
Azerbaijan 5 – 7 million 65 – 75 3 – 4 
Afghanistan 3 – 4 million 10 – 15 ~2 
Syria 3 – 4 million 15 – 20 ~2 
Saudi Arabia 2 – 4 million 10 – 15 1 – 2 
Nigeria <4 million <5 <2 
Lebanon 1 – 2 million 45 – 55 <1 
Tanzania <2 million <10 <1 
Kuwait 500,000 – 700,000 20 – 25 <1 
Germany 400,000 – 600,000 10 – 15 <1 
Bahrain 400,000 – 500,000 65 – 75 <1 
Tajikistan ~400,000 ~7 <1 
United Arab Emirates 300,000 – 400,000 ~10 <1 
United States 200,000 – 400,000 10 – 15 <1 
Oman 100,000 – 300,000 5 – 10 <1 
United Kingdom 100,000 – 300,000 10 – 15 <1 
Bulgaria ~100,000 10 – 15 <1 
Qatar ~100,000 ~10 <1 
World Total 154 – 200 million 10 – 13 100 
Note: Countries with an estimated Shia population of less than 1% of the country’s Muslim 
population are not listed. The figures for Shias are generally given in a range because of 
the limitations of the secondary-source data (see Methodology for Sunni-Shia Estimates). 
Figures may not sum to totals due to rounding. 
Pew Research Center’s Forum on Religion & Public Life • Mapping the Global Muslim 
Population, October 2009 
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In Syria, the uprising has become a sectarian war between two religious ideologies.  The 
Syrian regime, which supports the Shia rather than the Sunni, has gained heavy support from its 
Shia citizens and, furthermore, from external Shia allies. As the Syrian Shia allied with Bashar 
Al-Assad, many Sunni Jihadist groups (such as the Army of Conquest and The Islamic State) 
have successfully recruited large number of Syrian Sunni to their forces. Sunni leaders have 
represented the fighting as a religious battle. For example, Abdullah Muhaysini, top cleric of the 
Army of Conquest said, “The Aleppo battle was a truly divine one. … The lions roared, the 
heroes of this blessed … Army of Conquest” (Los Angeles Times, August 17/20016). Another 
cleric, Ibrahim Shasho, spoke of how “scores of the young men” had registered to become 
suicide bombers and prayed that the fighters would “purify the land of Syria from the filth of 
infidelity and the Shiites (Shia) and the Nusayris6” (Los Angeles Times, August 17/20016). The 
statements of the two leaders of one of the rebels’ armed groups indicates how the Syrian 
revolution, that started peacefully by people demanding regime change, has changed into a 
chaotic civil war and bloodbath stoked by sectarian differences. 
Since the uprising became an armed conflict, the opposition has formed many armed 
groups. According to the BBC, there are believed to be as many as 1,000 armed opposition 
groups in Syria commanding an estimated 100,000 fighters (BBC, December 13/2013). 
However, most of the rebels’ armed groups are minor players and small units that only keep their 
operations at a local level. The major armed groups within the opposition can be divided into 
five major sections according (BBC, 2013).  The first section is The Supreme Military Council 
of the Free Syrian Army, it is known to be a more moderate and stronger alternative to the 
jihadist rebel groups in Syria. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) includes many affiliates and 
                                                          
6 The Nusayris are part of the Alawite faith.  
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brigades such as Martyrs of Syria Brigades and Ahrar Souriya (Free Men of Syria) Brigade as an 
alliance to fight for its agenda. The second section is The Islamic Front, which was the outcome 
of collaboration between seven rebels armed groups: 
” seven Islamist groups - Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya, Jaysh al-Islam, Suqour al-
Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Liwa al-Haqq, Ansar al-Sham and the Kurdish Islamic Front - 
declared that they were forming the largest rebel alliance yet in the 33-month conflict, 
with an estimated 45,000 fighters. They said the new Islamic Front was an "independent 
political, military and social formation" that aimed to "topple the Assad regime 
completely and build an Islamic state". They outlined a new command structure, with key 
roles shared between the seven groups, and said they would work towards a "gradual 
merger" (BBC, December 13/2013). 
                            
The third section is the Jihadist Groups, a similar development as happened in Iraq after the 
American invasion in 2003. Many jihadist groups formed and managed to recruit large numbers 
of fighters, both locals and foreigners. The jihadist groups in the Syrian civil war contain some 
extremist and radical Islamic groups, like The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or known as 
(DAESH) in Arabic, Al-Nusra (Support) Front, and Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa al-Ansar (Army of 
the Emigrants and Helpers).  
The fourth section is the Kurdish Groups. The Kurds are one component of Syrian 
society, and they have played a major role in this conflict. They have tried to protect their areas 
that are located in North-Eastern Syria. The major forces of the Kurds are The Popular Protection 
Units (YPG) and The Democratic Unity Party (PYD). “The PYD has tried to keep the Kurds out 
of the conflict and consolidate its territorial gains. However, there has been occasional fighting 
with government troops, and since November 2012 also deadly clashes between the YPG and 
rebel fighters - particularly those from Islamist and jihadist brigades” (BBC, December 13/2013). 
The fifth section of the Syrian rebel groups is the Independent Groups. They range 
between conservative Islamist to some moderate Islamist and nationalist fighters, such as the 
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independent groups including Ahfad al-Rasoul (Grandsons of the Prophet) Brigades, Yarmouk 
Martyrs' Brigade, and Kataib al-Wihda al-Wataniya The (National Unity Brigades). 
Unfortunately for Syria, the revolution has been converted into a field for ideological and 
sectarian struggle between the rebels themselves. This has prevented the opposition groups from 
assembling their armed power and efforts to overthrow Al-Assad’s reign, which was the primary 
intention of the people in 2011. This situation is unlike what happened to Al-Gaddafi’s regime in 
Libya. There the rebel groups successfully unified their forces and efforts in order to overthrow 
the dictator. In term of religious ideology, the Libyan society structure (see Table 1) does not 
show the type of sectarianism that exists within Syrian society. The Islamic sectarianism within 
Syrian society has advanced Al-Assad due to the diffuse society structure and the inability to 
provide a single revolutionary front. Al-Assad has gained massive support from the Shia while 
his opposition, who are the majority Sunni, has failed to unify their plans in the fight against him. 
Furthermore, the rebels’ armed forces have fallen into a struggle of dogmatic beliefs resulting in 
clashes against each other. The variation between the opposition’s agendas and sectarianism has 
been one of the reasons that have resulted in the survival of al-Assad’s regime. 
Beside the doctrinal divergence, the structure of the Syrian society has suffered from an 
ethnic conflict. The Arab majority of the society is not in a cooperative relationship with the 
Kurds, who represent one of the biggest minority groups in Syria. The Kurdish areas are located 
in the North-East of Syria, and they have long history in the region (TheKurdishProject.Org, 
2016):   
The Kurdish region of northeastern Syria is inhabited primarily by people of Kurdish 
descent. It is estimated that less than 2 million Kurds live within the Kurdish region of 
northeastern Syria, also known as Rojava, constituting the largest ethnic minority in 
Syria; Currently, the largest political group in the Kurdish region of Syria is the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD). The PYD is a Kurdish political party that was founded 
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in 2003 as an affiliate of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey. Founded by 
Kurdish activists, the party has between 60,000 and 80,000 members. The PYD is the 
primary Kurdish force fighting against the Syrian Government and against the Islamic 
State. The military wing of the PYD includes both the People’s Protection Units (YPG) 
and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ).” 
The Kurds have always demanded recognition and to pursue their independence from the ruling 
class of Syria. The Kurds, in fact, are not in favor of either the Syrian regime or the opposition 
groups. However, they see the benefit of joining any coalition that guarantees their safety within 
the Kurdistan region and advances their national interests. They have experienced fighting 
against almost all of the belligerents of the Syrian civil war. Salih Muslim, head of the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is the biggest Kurdish party in Syria, was quoted as 
saying that his group does not support the Kurdish National Council (KNC) joining the Syrian 
National Coalition (SNC): “I think it’s going to divide the Kurdish people, because there was a 
decision by the Supreme Kurdish Council not to deal with any side of the opposition without 
permission” (Rudwa.net, September 30/2013).7  
According to Salih Muslim, one of the reasons that may prevent the Kurds from joining 
the Syrian opposition is its fragmentation, “He pointed out that the Syrian opposition is not 
homogenous, he said, there are different ideas, opinions, and ideologically they are not the same” 
(Rudwa.net, September 30/2013). The collaboration between the Kurds and the Syrian 
opposition, particularly, the Syrian National Collation, is on the negotiation table. Salih Muslim 
and Ahmed Al-Jarba (the president of the Syrian National Collation) discussed the possibility of 
alliances between both sides. Muslim described the meeting with the Syrian National Coalition, 
“The latest was the meeting of our representatives with coalition leader Ahmed Al-Jarba in Paris, 
                                                          
7 Rudaw is a Kurdish media network funded and supported by Rudaw Company, the network 
aims to impart news and information about Kurdistan and the Middle East in a professional 
manner.   
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but even at that meeting they denied the existence of the Kurds. They don’t want to recognize the 
Kurds and the administration we set up at Rojava. Our most basic demand is recognition of 
Kurdish rights in the new constitution to be drafted. But they don’t even want to talk about it” 
(Al-Monitor.com, June 23/2014). The addition of the Kurds would be a large boost for the 
opposition groups in the efforts to defeat Al-Assad’s troops, but unfortunately such an alliance 
cannot occur on the ground, which benefits Al-Assad. 
 The Kurdish factor cannot be neglected in explaining the persistence of the Syrian civil 
war. Since the beginning of the revolution the main focus for the Kurds has been to secure their 
territories and cities against invasion. The Kurds, with the assistance of the United States and 
Russia, have been successfully holding off the ISIS militants from advancing into their lands 
(The New York Times, April 21/2016). The Kurdish forces would provide great assistance to the 
rebel forces if they could agree to collaborate. Even the United States’ ambassador in Syria, 
Robert Ford, met with a delegation of Syrian Kurds and asked them join the Syrian revolution, 
promising them that the Syrian opposition’s program would grant them self-rule and guarantee 
their cultural rights (Alakhbar.com, March 6/2015). After the declaration of the Kurdish 
autonomous zone, the chances of collaboration between the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian rebels 
might have increased. But until this kind of agreement can be substantiated the Syrian civil war 
will continue to be defined by the fragmentation of Syrian society structure. 
Unlike the other Arab states that were involved in what was called “The Arab Spring,” 
Syria has faced more complicated challenges. Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya did not have to 
deal with the issue of religious sectarianism nor the variation in dogmatic faiths. The Libyan 
revolution, like the Syrian, became a massive civil war. Contrary to Syria, in Libya the rebels’ 
armed forces unified their efforts to overcome the regime’s forces, and the issue of religious 
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sectarianism was not an obstacle to accomplishing the objectives of the revolution. The Sunni-
Shia conflict within Syria has divided the society resulting in the lack of effectiveness in terms of 
armed resistance. Moreover, the opposition side has also presented many different agendas that 
have divided their effort in fighting Al-Assad and his alliances. Furthermore, the structure of 
Syrian society is more complex than Libya or other Arab countries with regard to ethnicity. Syria 
contains many ethnic minorities who have been involved in the war, specifically the Kurds. Even 
though the Syrian National Coalition tried to attract the Kurds to fight with other opposition 
groups against the Syrian regime, the Kurds were not persuaded to join the opposition efforts. 
The dispersion of efforts in opposing and fighting Al-Assad’s regime that have resulted from the 
structure of Syrian society has been a weak point in the foundation of the Syrian revolution. 
Religious divergence and ethnic diversity in Syria have played a role in the survival of Al-Assad 
and the continuation of the civil war.   
Libya    
In contrast to the Syrian case, the aspect of social fragmentation was not a major factor in 
the Libyan revolution. In Libya, the society is not being affected by dogmatic cleavages. Libya is 
among those Arab countries that do not show religious diversity within its state borders (Table 
1). Hence, Libyan society has not suffered the historical conflict between the two major Muslim 
faiths (Sunni and Shia), and the divergence of the Islamic faith followers did not affect the 
revolution of Libya. Additionally, the matter of Islamic extremism fueled by the idea of fighting 
the “infidels” of the Shia and the Alawite was not a part of the Libyan revolution. However, the 
sectarian division came to the surface in the aftermath of the revolution, which is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. The National Public Radio (NPR) reporter Corey Flintoff reported “That 
Mustafa Abdul-Jalil, the former head of the Transitional National Council, said at a recent rally 
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that Shariah, or Islamic law, should be the main source of Libya's laws, he added that Libyans 
will not accept any extremist ideology, either to the right or the left” (NPR.org, September 
21/2011). The same article also quoted Ali Tarhouni, an economist who serves as deputy prime 
minister on the council (the Transitional National Council or TNC). Tarhouni agreed that 
Libyans favor a moderate form of Islam, but acknowledged that extremism is a concern by 
saying "This version of radicalization, I think that's an issue that we are concerned about and we 
talk about it openly…But so far, regardless of what you see, I'm not too worried about it” 
(NPR.org, September 21/2011). The officials of the Libyan Transitional National Council were 
not concerned about Islamic extremist groups during the Libyan revolution as they were not 
playing a major role in the fighting, unlike their counterparts in Syria.  The efforts of the Libyan 
rebels were not divided by religious fragmentation. 
Moreover, Libyan society structure does not feature the divisions of races or ethnicity we 
see in Syria between the Arabs and the Kurds. Libyan society consists of almost all Arabs with a 
few small minority groups like the Imazighen (Berbers) and a group of people called the 
Gybsies. The situation in Libya was not division between religious groups or ethnicities, but 
between the tribes of the Libyan regions who all belonged to one ethnic group, the Arab. Babak 
Dehghanpisheh reported that: 
“Gaddafi has systematically stripped down Libyan civil society, banning every 
conceivable kind of organization”, he added “In Libya, there’s no political parties, no 
trade unions, no teacher’s organizations, no Lions Clubs or Kiwanis Clubs,” says Ronald 
Bruce St. John, an expert on Libya who’s written several books about the country, 
“Gaddafi created his own monster, in a sense. He made the tribes more and more 
important because that was the only place people could go to get personal and group 
reinforcement” (Newsweek.com, March 13/2011).  
The same article also said that: 
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“Civilian and military leaders of the Libyan opposition clearly understand how important 
it is to unify their support, “There’s contact with the tribes every day,” says Gen. Ahmed 
Gatrani, a senior member of the opposition military council, indicating that he was going 
to talk to one tribal leader later the same afternoon” (Newsweek.com, March 13/2011).  
The leaders of the Libyan revolutionary forces recognized the importance of the Libyan tribal 
system in order to unify the Libyan society to stand as one against Colonel Al-Gaddafi and his 
regime forces. Eventually the Libyan rebels successfully attracted most of the Libyan tribes to 
their cause, and the rebels accomplished their goal of removing Al-Gaddafi.  
Foreign Intervention  
Syria 
It is rare to find an armed conflict, whether between countries or within a country, 
without any foreign intervention. The Syrian civil war is not an exception. Alliances have played 
an essential role throughout many conflicts in world history. The two World Wars illustrate the 
importance of having alliances to be on the victorious side by the end of the struggle, especially 
to have one of the world’s major powers at your side. Syria is one of the leading countries within 
the Middle East, and it has been a part of many struggles during the last century before and after 
its independence. The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the examples of the involvement of Syria in 
a regional conflict when Syria allied with Egypt and Jordan during the wars of 1967 and 1973. 
Therefore, the Syrian regime, since the time of Al-Assad senior, has realized the importance of 
having powerful alliances, especially when it is understood that challenges may occur at any 
time within this unstable region of the world. 
The Syrian regime received strong support politically and, most importantly, on the 
ground in actual fighting, from two alliances: Iran represented the regional power, and Russia 
56 
 
 
represented the international power. Al-Assad answered an El Pais reporter regarding the foreign 
help that the Syrian regime received in this way: “Definitely the Russian and the Iranian support 
were essential for our army to make this advancement” (El Pais, February 21/2016). Iran sent 
units from the Revolutionary Guard and encouraged Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia based militia, 
to fight beside Al-Assad’s troops on the ground. Russia launched a series of heavy air strikes and 
by October 2015, according to The Daily Telegraph, “Russia's defense ministry has said that its 
air force had hit 1,596 ‘terrorist targets’ in eight regions including Aleppo, Latakia, Hama and 
Homs provinces in the past week” (The Telegraph.co.uk, February 12/2016). The Russian air 
strikes allegedly targeted terrorist groups’ strongholds. However, the main intention of the 
Russian intervention was to secure the role of Al-Assad in Syria since Damascus is a strategic 
regional ally to Moscow. The reporter of Russia Direct Yury Barmin has stated: 
“Everything changed when Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the launch of a 
military operation against Assad’s enemies. Russian jets not only helped the Syrian Arab 
Army regain control over recently lost areas that were crucial for the stability of the 
regime but also secured Assad’s presidency at least for the short term. And this is exactly 
what guarantees the Syrian leader’s survival” (Russia Direct, April 20/2016). 
And according to CNN:  
“The domestic political imperative has shaped Russia's tactics in Syria. The primary goal 
has never been to defeat ISIS, but to prop up the Assad regime. As Putin said on Russian 
television last month, ‘stabilizing the lawful authority’ is the key objective of the Russian 
intervention in Syria. After Assad's reception in the Kremlin on October 20, Russia may 
feel in his debt” (CNN, November 20/2015). 
The Russian government sees the regime of Al-Assad as the only lawful authority in Syria and 
maybe the only government that could enhance Russian influence within the Middle East. Other 
major countries in the region, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are on the side of the United States. 
Al-Assad needs Russia in order to maintain his rule in the country and Putin needs Syria in order 
to promote the Russian role in the region. Russia will not let Al-Assad and his regime down as 
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the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said: “Russia has given nobody any promises 
regarding Syria” (sputniknews.com, June 16/2016). The full context of Lavrov’s statement 
regarding Syria at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum is: "First of all, we have not 
promised anyone to do anything. We have given no promises to anyone, but agreed that 
everyone working on the Syrian settlement will be guided by agreements reached by the 
International Syria Support Group, which have been written down in UN Security Council 
Resolutions" (sputniknews.com, June 16/2016). Lavrov made this statement after one of many 
temporary ceasefires that had taken place on the ground since the first ceasefire that started on 
February 17th 2016. All ceasefire attempts displayed some violations. The non-stop military 
operations in Syria between the many combatants, including the rebels armed units and the 
Islamic extremist groups, and the ongoing political struggle will most likely mean the 
continuance of the Russian intervention in Syrian and Russia’s full support of the current Syrian 
regime. With Russia beside them, the Syrian regime is growing in power not only militarily but 
also politically.  
The United Nation intended to refer the Syrian conflict to the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) in 2014.  However, Russia pledged to veto the move. Moscow's position, was 
announced by Gennady Gatilov, the deputy foreign minister: "The draft that has been submitted 
to the UN security council is unacceptable to us, and we will not support it," and followed by, "If 
it is put to a vote, we will veto it" (The Guardian.com, May 20/2014). This kind of political 
support was not available to the Libyan regime from any of the world’s major powers, 
specifically Russia. The lack of political support was one of the main reasons for the collapse of 
the Libyan regime in the aftermath of the Arab Spring uprisings. When NATO decided to launch 
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air strikes against Al-Gaddafi, there was no country to threaten using some kind of veto to 
prevent a related UN resolution. 
As Russia is acting as an international ally to the Syrian regime, Iran is their main 
regional ally and supporter on the battlefield since the beginning of the Syrian revolution. Syria 
is one among very few Arab countries, specifically, and Muslim countries in general that has a 
good relationship with Iran, especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979. Most of the 
Muslim world and the Arab countries have not developed meaningful relations with Iran due to 
the ideological differences between the Sunni doctrine and the Shia, since most of the Muslim 
world is Sunni. Iran cannot afford losing its closest Arab ally, and the Iranian former president 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad made it clear from the very beginning of the uprising that Iran would be 
always in the side of Al-Assad when he said “There was no limit to expanding ties with Syria, 
and Iran would do all in its power to support this country” (Huffington post, March 27,2012). 
Supporting a country should mean doing the best possible actions for that country, but for Iran 
supporting Syria means protecting Al-Assad and assisting him to remain in power rather than 
listening to public demands and trying to end the chaos within Syria.  
At first, Iranian officials did not admit that they were sending military troops to fight with 
the Syrian regime army. Iran claimed that they were sending some military advisers to Syria in 
the aid of Al-Assad’s troops, but reports from the battlefield have shown that they are actually 
Iranian fighters fighting the battles on the ground side by side with the Syrian regime troops. 
Moreover, Iran has mobilized battalions of some Shia units including fighters from Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Also, Hezbollah (the Lebanese Shia militia) has been in Syria since 
the very beginning of the conflict (Aljazeera.com, October 1/2015). With an increasing number 
of Iranian causalities in Syria, the officials of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards have had to 
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declare the Iranian military intervention in Syria. As Hossein Ali Rezayi, a Guards spokesman in 
the region, told the ISNA (Iranian Students’ News Agency) and Fars news agencies when 
announcing Iranian losses in Khan Touman (a village located south of Aleppo) in December of 
2015: “The names of those killed and when their remains will be repatriated will be announced 
later, all were from Iran's northern province of Mazandaran” (Aljazeera news, May 7/2016). 
Robert Fisk, the reporter for The Independent, witnessed the presence of Iranian fighters by 
saying, “We knew who they were the moment they approached us on the front line outside 
Aleppo. The Iranian Revolutionary Guards – no longer merely advisers but fighting troops 
alongside the Syrian army – emerged on the roadside in their grey-patterned camouflage 
fatigues, speaking good though not perfect Arabic but chatting happily in Persian when they 
knew we could understand them” (The Independent, February 13, 2016). It was no longer hidden 
that Iran is involved in the Syrian armed conflict in favor of the regime by sending units of its 
Revolutionary Guards. Major Abu Osama al-Jolani, a Free Syrian Army (FSA) commander and 
defected officer described how the war had changed: “The Shia militias are leading military 
action to support the regime in all battles for the last year, everyone we are fighting now are 
foreigners” (MiddleEastEye.net, November 18/2015). The support of Iran helped Syrian troops 
to regain many important areas that they had lost to the rebels since 2011, especially in the city 
of Aleppo. Without this support the Syrian regime may have lost more territories to the rebel 
forces. 
Foreign intervention in the Syrian conflict has altered the balance of power amongst the 
belligerents. The allies of the Al-Assad, Russia and Iran, were very effective in overcoming the 
rebels and helping the Syrian regime troops to advance in many battles. The Russian air force 
and Iranian units on the ground ensured many victories for the Syrian regime’s troops. One of 
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the reasons Al-Assad and his regime, unlike Al-Gaddafi, have managed to survive the Syrian war 
and maintain the position of the president of Syria is by having alliances. At the time of writing, 
Russia and Iran are still behind Al-Assad politically and militarily, which gives him the upper 
hand, at least on the battlefields. The consequence is that Al-Assad may not come to a settlement 
with the opposition, and he is not ready yet to give up power for the foreseeable future. 
Libya 
In Libya the situation was totally opposite. It was the NATO air force that helped the 
rebel troops to advance and overcome the regime army and militias. The NATO intervention in 
Libya was led by the United States, and the declared goal for the mission was humanitarian, to 
protect civilian from the strikes of Al-Gaddafi’s air force. Regime change was not one of the 
declared agendas of the NATO invention. Therefore, the objective of the NATO intervention 
was to build a no-fly zone as stated by President Barack Obama On March 28, 2011, when he 
addressed the nation: “The task that I assigned our forces [is] to protect the Libyan people from 
immediate danger and to establish a no-fly zone.… Broadening our military mission to include 
regime change would be a mistake” (foreignpolicy.com, March 11/2016). Also, the statement of 
Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon echoed this stance when he declared that, “The 
military mission of the United States is designed to implement the Security Council resolution, 
no more and no less.… I mean protecting civilians against attacks from Qaddafi’s forces and 
delivering humanitarian aid” (foriegnpolicy.com, March 11/2016).  
Yet the NATO intervention played a major role in the overthrow of the Libyan regime 
and the removal of Al-Gaddafi. Once the UN Security Council gave the green light to NATO, 
the Libyan rebels started to advance over Al-Gaddafi’s forces on the battlefield. The foreign 
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involvement in Libya benefitted the rebels, while in Syria it advanced the regime. Although the 
officials of the western coalition that intervened in the Libyan revolution denied any intention of 
regime change there is evidence that regime change was part of their agenda. For example, Al-
Gaddafi’s administrative and residence compound in Tripoli was targeted by Tomahawk cruise 
missiles launched from NATO submarines stationed in the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the 
Western Coalition allowed some regional forces to intervene in the conflict by permitting some 
air forces of Qatar and Egypt to launch a series of attacks on Al-Gaddafi’s troops. According to 
Micah Zenko, of Foreign Policy magazine, “on Oct. 20, 2011, it was a U.S. Predator drone and 
French fighter aircraft that attacked a convoy of regime loyalists trying to flee Qaddafi’s 
hometown of Sirte. The dictator was injured in the attack, captured alive, and then extra 
judicially murdered by rebel forces” (foriegnpolicy.com, March 11/2016). It seems clear that in 
the case of Libya foreign intervention enabled, rather than prevented, regime change.              
Summary of Results 
After more than five years of civil war in Syria the struggle is not likely to reach its 
resolution in the near future. The demands of freedom, justice and equality that started the Syrian 
revolution in 2011 have become a massive armed conflict that has torn the country apart. In 
contrast to the outcome of the Arab Spring movement in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, the 
Syrian movement did not achieve its desired objectives. In comparison to the case in Libya, 
which had suffered from the transformation of the people’s demands into a civil war as well, 
Syria has a greater complexity of elements that have affected the outcome of the whole situation, 
starting from the people’s demonstration and leading to the ongoing civil war. 
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 It is true that both countries had been under the control of dictatorships, however, there 
are many differences in the characteristics of the dictators. Two main points can illustrate the 
dissimilarities between Al-Assad and Al-Gaddafi. First is the factor of age. Al-Gaddafi was an 
old dictator who belonged to the era of post-colonialization, who often gave aggressive speeches 
and usually delivered them in local Arabic dialect. Al-Assad is a modern educated president who 
regularly uses the language of contemporary logic via the common Arabic dialect. As a result, 
Al-Assad succeeded to convince and gather his supporters to fight for him while Al-Gaddafi 
failed to do the same. Second is the factor of religious affiliation. Al-Assad’s membership of a 
minority sect has affected his choice of a trusted circle. He has appointed many of his family 
members, and other Alawite and pro-Shia figures, to high positions within the Syrian regime to 
ensure their loyalty. Al-Gaddafi, however, was not as successful as Al-Assad in this matter, and 
two of his ministers8 joined the rebels by the time of the revolution. 
The military institution in Syria has also contributed towards the survival of Al-Assad. 
The loyalty of the military institution in Syria was to the Syrian regime, rather than being on the 
side of the nation and the volition of its people. In contrast, many units of the Libyan military 
institution rejected the regime’s commands to bomb and attack the protesters and followed the 
path of rebellion after a few weeks of the Libyan uprising. In Syria, the loyalty of the military is 
for the ruling party, “Al-Baath,” and to their leaders, and many of those leaders have strong 
devotion to the president and his sect. 
The Sunni-Shia conflict has negatively impacted the outcome of the Syrian revolution. 
Syrian society has been divided into three camps. The first camp consists of the supporters of the 
                                                          
8 Abdul Fatah Younis who was the minister of interior within the Libyan regime, and Mustafa 
Abdul Jalil the minister of justice who was one of Al-Gaddafi’s closes friends. 
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regime, mainly the Shia and their alliances. The second camp is the opposition to Al-Assad, 
mainly the Sunni groups. Unfortunately, for the effort of the Syrian uprising, this camp is divided 
into many groups based on religious faith or national interest. The third camp is the Kurds who 
seek to establish the autonomy of the Kurdish area in the northeast of the country. Unlike the 
case of Libya, which did not have to face the challenges generated by the religious or ethnic 
diversity of its society, the Syrian revolution lacks coherence because of the obstacles that 
emerge from the structure of the society. 
Finally, the role of foreign intervention in the Syrian case is more complex than the 
Libyan case. The Libyan regime did not rely on powerful regional or international alliances like 
the regime of Al-Assad has. Therefore, the Libyan regime did not receive any foreign support 
and all of the foreign intervention was to the advantage of the rebels. In the Syrian case, with 
Russia as its main international ally and Iran as its main regional ally, the Syrian regime has 
received political and military backing in order to resist its opposition. 
 
  
64 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
After analyzing the thesis questions and comparing the variables of the Syrian revolution 
case to the Libyan one, the main finding of this thesis is that religious sectarianism has played a 
role in every aspect of the Syrian revolution. The Sunni-Shia conflict has affected the Syrian 
uprising the most. First of all, the President is in favor with the Shia rather than Sunni. He is pro-
Shia and allied with the Shia forces internally and externally. Secondly, the military institution of 
Syria is under the control of the Alawite sect and pro-Shia leaders resulting in the military’s 
strong loyalty to the regime and its leaders rather than the nation and its people. Thirdly, the 
structure of the Syrian society in term of religious faith is divided between Sunni and Shia 
Muslims, and they have not set any terms of agreement to link their efforts against Al-Assad. 
Sunnis and Shias have chosen different sides and fight each other. Finally, the issue of foreign 
intervention is also impacted by the Sunni-Shia struggle. Iran supports the Syrian regime as part 
of their strategy to support Shias since the Islamic revolution in Iran. Many of the Shia militias 
from Iraq, Lebanon, and Afghanistan have been encouraged by Iranian leaders to go to Syria to 
assist Al-Assad. The conflict of sectarianism within the Muslim world has its historical roots 
back to the first century of Islam, and since then it has torn the Muslim world apart and causes 
many bloody conflicts. The Syrian civil war is the contemporary manifestation of this history. 
The definition of civil war provided by Kalyvas (2006) is clearly applicable to the Syrian 
revolution. Public demonstration has been converted into an armed confrontation between the 
current political system and its dissatisfied subjects, and the society has divided into a number of 
parties fighting to advance their interests. Beside the forces of the regime, there are other armed 
forces that represent the opposition groups of the Syrian subjects such as the Free Syrian Army, 
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the Kurdish forces, and the Jihadist armed groups. The main goal of the Syrian uprisings was to 
change the regime of Al-Assad. However, the rebels were fractured into more than one group. 
Even though they shared a common goal at first, they have faced disagreements throughout the 
length of the revolution and civil war. This division matches the argument of Pearlman (2013) on 
the fragmented society and the lack of coordination among its actors. Moreover, the situation of 
the Syrian revolution proves Gurr’s (1970) argument of how the ideologies of the rebels may 
differ and, therefore, risk the success of the revolution. The issue of the diversity of ideologies is 
valid in the Syrian case as the revolution has suffered from the challenges of religious schism 
and ethnic cleavages. 
The analysis of the Syrian regime also supports autocratic resilience theory discussed by 
De Mesquita (2003) and Gallagher and Hanson (2013). The theory explained autocratic 
resilience and the survival of a regime via the selectorate group and the winning coalition. Al-
Assad, unlike Al-Gaddafi, formed his winning coalition a long time before the uprising of his 
subjects. The Syrian regime has allied with a combination of internal and external groups and, as 
the result of those choices, has survived the Arab Spring uprisings while other regimes failed. 
Al-Assad has also successfully constructed a selectorate group by his choice of governmental 
high ranked individuals. He has carefully chosen most of them from the elite circle of his family, 
sect and Shia supporters. Furthermore, as mentioned by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014), the 
hierarchical system of the government has been crucial to the persistence of Syria’s autocratic 
regime. The thesis supports the statement of Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) that hierarchical 
connections are a feature of autocratic selections. Based on the characteristics of its leader, the 
Syrian regime has decided many of its actions, and the reflection of Al-Assad’s characteristics 
have impacted the Syrian revolution and transformed it into the Syrian civil war. 
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According to the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), there has been a staggering number 
of around 470,000 deaths in the Syrian civil war since 2011 (PBS.org, February 11/2016). “In 
all, 11.5% of the country’s population have been killed or injured since the crisis erupted in 
March 2011,” the report estimates. The number of wounded is put at 1.9 million and life 
expectancy has dropped from 70 in 2010 to 55.4 in 2015. Overall economic losses are estimated 
at $255bn (£175bn)” (the Guardian, February 10/2016.). Furthermore, “according to the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 4.8 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, 
Jordan, Egypt and Iraq, and 6.6 million are internally displaced within Syria. Meanwhile about 
one million have requested asylum to Europe. Germany, with more than 300,000 cumulated 
applications, and Sweden with 100,000, are EU’s top receiving countries” (UNHCR.org, 
September 4/2016). These numbers are just one way to illustrate the horrible situation in Syria, 
and to display the negative outcome of the ongoing conflict between the regime of Syria and its 
opposition. The civil war in Syria is still ongoing at the time of writing, with no signs on the 
horizon that the situation may find a conclusion to one of the most destructive civil wars in the 
region, and to put an end to the misery of millions of people. 
The continuous tension in Syria has had an impact on the entire region, and it is affecting 
international security as well. With many regional countries involved in the chaos (including 
Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia) the regional instability tension may cause a larger war. The 
relations between the neighboring countries of the region have faced many uncertainties during 
the past, some of them leading to wars against each other. The probability of a war within the 
region and among its countries has always existed. Nowadays with the growing tension of the 
Syrian war, the probability of a new war in the region has increased. Also, there is a real concern 
that a larger war involving some of the world’s major power (like the United States and Russia) 
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is possible. The involvement of many major powers in a single struggle has proven to be 
devastating. For example, the entanglement of alliances prior to the World War I produced a 
major conflagration. The region has suffered from many wars in the past that have caused 
instability: For instance, the Iraqi-Iranian war in 1980-1988, the Gulf war of 1990-1991, and the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. Another massive war will probably produce more hatred and distrustful 
relationships between the nations of the region, as well as generating greater tensions that will 
negatively disturb international security. 
 Further research is suggested by my thesis. A deeper research examining and analyzing 
the conflicts and tensions triggered by the dogmatic dissimilarity of the Muslims two major 
beliefs, the Sunni and the Shia, especially after the Islamic Revolution in Iran, would be another 
approach to understanding the reason behind the many tensions and conflicts in the Arab world. 
The region contains the holy places for both doctrines: Saudi Arabia for the Sunnis, and Iran for 
the Shias. In addition, studying the relationships between the regional powers of the Middle East 
and the world’s major powers might reveal vital aspects of how Middle Eastern elites may act 
toward further uprisings.  
Al-Assad has survived the rebellion of his subjects for roughly five years and has led his 
country towards destruction. The leaders of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya had fallen to the 
demands of the public within a few days in Tunisia and Egypt, a few weeks in Yemen, and a few 
months in Libya. Yet Al-Assad has resisted the similar demands of his people. Instead of 
accomplishing freedom, justice, and equality the Syrians are suffering from the destruction of the 
country as the outcome of an uprising that lost its way. 
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